East-west European migration: questions and some answers by Ghatak, Subrata & Daly, Vince
  1 
 
EAST-WEST EUROPEAN MIGRATION: QUESTIONS 
AND SOME ANSWERS 
by 
Subrata Ghatak* 
and  
Vince Daly** 
School of Economics 
Kingston University 
Penrhyn Road 
Kingston Upon Thames 
Surrey KT1 2EE 
 
* - Professor of Economics; ** - Head, School of Economics 
  2 
EAST-WEST EUROPEAN MIGRATION: QUESTIONS AND SOME ANSWERS 
1. Introduction 
The economics of migration has demonstrated that there are significant differences between labour 
markets and real wages in West (WU) and East European (EAU) countries (see eg Ghatak, S., 
Levine, P., Wheatley Price, 1996; Hatton, 1998).  For instance, social welfare measures providing 
unemployment, insurance, pension rights and other income support benefits are now much less in 
EAU in comparison with the WU countries.  Such differences in labour welfare measures can lead 
to major behavioural differences in the operations of labour markets. Unemployment may be 
disguised in EAU as the marginal (extra) productivity of many jobs (eg in agriculture and service 
sector) may be zero or close to zero.  Note that such „disguised unemployment‟ is not welfare 
enhancing in the aggregate as observed employment contribute little to the aggregate output or 
real income. 
Secondly, labour markets in the whole of Europe are marked by substantial differences in 
real wages and incomes.  Of major importance are questions regarding the sources of these 
differences in real wages.  One obvious source is difference in labour productivity.  But there are 
other unanswered questions.  Are these real wage differences the product of high competitive 
market forces? To what extent has the price/wage-setting behaviour of  large firms or 
governments contributed to such differences? 
Each probability underlines a different set of policy prescriptions.  Notice that most of the 
writings on migration including the seminal contribution of Harris and Todaro (1969) and Todaro 
(1970) focus on the real wage differences as the main motor behind labour migration. A related 
feature of European labour markets is the contrast in techniques of production.  Even within the 
EAU countries, some sectors use highly capital-intensive techniques with others using quite 
backward technologies.  Clearly, the existence of such a phenomenon highlights the need for a 
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debate concerning the choice of appropriate technology for EAU economies (see Sen, A., 1964). 
It also poses the question as to whether the EAU workers in low technology sectors will migrate 
between technologies or between countries. 
Finally, a major feature of some EAU countries is relatively low levels of education in 
comparison with  WU countries, particularly in the field of market economics, business, law and 
advanced science.  Given the relative scarcity of „human capital‟, one should expect high rates of 
return to agents for investment in human capital.  These high rates of return do no seem to exist, 
eg in Poland - an EAU country which is supposed to reward little to the highly educated 
manpower.  For this reason, the question naturally arises: what is the correlation between 
education and migration? Many have focused on the macroeconomic issues like real-wage 
differences, probability of finding a job, real wage flexibility and benefit payments. However, the 
main motivation of writing this paper is to emphasise the micro-characteristics of immigrants, 
labour market behaviour (prompted by economic, political and sociological forces within the host 
countries) in the light of the enlargement of the Western European Union and its possible 
eastward expansion with the fall of the Iron Curtain.  The other motivation lies in emphasizing the 
need for undertaking interdisciplinary research to enhance our understanding of the welfare impact 
of migration within a larger European Union.The rest of the paper is organised as follows: 
Section 2 outlines the policy debate in Europe and asks some basic questions.  Section 3 
summarises the economic theories of migration and welfare.  In section 4, we describe the need 
for developing a micro-based, interdisciplinary approach to understand and evaluate the costs and 
benefits of migration.  The final section concludes by setting out a future research agenda for 
analysis of  the causes and consequences of European migration. 
2. European Migration: The Policy Debate 
A number of factors contributed to the current policy debate on East-West European migration.  
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For instance: 
I. The enlargement of the Western European Union and the subsequent relaxation of  
internal border controls to allow free mobility of labour within Europe. 
ii. The eastward expansion of the European Union with the possibility of full membership of 
Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic of the EAU within the next decade. 
iii. The declining and ageing population in Europe.  
 The migration policy debate has received additional attention with the rise of  the neo-Nazi 
movements in some Western European countries, particularly in France and Germany.  
Some of the major questions asked in this context are as follows: 
a. Who are the migrants and do they  rob our jobs and lower our wages? 
b. What will be the size of the flows? 
c. Do immigrants live off our social security systems? 
d. How do we measure the welfare of the „donor‟ and „recipient‟ countries? 
e. How well do immigrants perform in the recipient country? 
f. How does the process of „social assimilation‟ or „exclusion‟ take place? 
g. How does the political system help or hinder the welfare of the immigrants and the 
host country? 
h. How do we analyse the problem of „illegal‟ immigration and political asylum and 
refugees and can we explain return migration? 
i. To what extent migration a gendered issue? 
 
Many researchers have contributed to the different aspects of the debate.  But, so far, few 
have tried to investigate the issues in migration from a broad socio-political and economic 
angle.  In what follows, we will first discuss the economics of migration and welfare and 
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then draw attention to some of its limitations. 
3. Economics of Migration and Welfare 
In dualistic theories of economic growth and development (see e.g.Lewis, W.A., 1954; Ghatak, S. 
1995; Ray,D, 1999), migration is regarded as a key to economic growth.  Economic growth is 
explained as a process where labour is transferred from a low productivity to a high productivity 
sector, thereby increasing total output and real income of the whole society.  Thus, labour 
migration is regarded as a welfare-enhancing mechanism.  Figure 1 illustrates. 
The gains from factor mobility (e.g. labour) within an enlarged EU can be shown with figure.1. 
Assume factors are homogeneous and the initial availability of the factor Qa in country A and Qb 
in country B.  The total supply of say, labour, is QA +QB which is fixed.  The gain from 
employment of an additional unit of factor (i.e. MPL) varies with the quantity of labour, Q. This 
relationship is shown for countries A and B respectively by MPA (see fig. 1(a)) and MPB (fig. 
1(b)).  Without factor i.e. labour, mobility between A and B countries, the MPL in country A is PA 
(employing QA); in B, the MPL is higher and thus PB > PA.  In country B, employment is QB.  If a 
unit of labour moves from A to B, its MPL would rise from PA to PB.  Thus, it is incentive 
compatible for a factor to move from A to B until MP in the two countries is equalized at PC.   
Here, a quantity (QA - Q‟A) in fig. 1(a) (equal to Q‟B - QB) in fig. 1(b) has moved to country B, 
raising factor supply in B from QB to Q‟B.  The total gain from factor mobility is shown by the 
difference in MP for each unit of the factor, aggregated for all units moving to country B.  This is 
shown in fig.1(b) by the shaded area  ½ (Pb - PA ) (Q‟B - QB) 
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Figure 1 
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East-West Migration: Some ‘Stylised Facts’: 
Interestingly enough, East-West European migration has been a major feature of labour mobility 
in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries (Hatton ,T and J Williams,1998).  Such 
migration occurred in the following stages: 
1) In stage one, two different types of migration occurred: a) European mass migration to the 
new world, particularly to the USA and Canada; b) Massive internal migration from the rural to 
the major urban areas in search of better life. 
2) The next East-West migration within Europe was the direct consequence of the Second 
world War.  The treaties of Yalta and Potsdam led to the uprooting of many Germans, Poles and 
many Eastern European people.  But the cold war and the iron curtain halted most of the East-
West migration.  Even so, about 13.3 million people migrated from the East to the West  
(Fassman and Munz, 1994).  More than 75% of such migration between 1950 and 1993 can be 
classified as „ethnic migration‟. 
3) The fall of the iron curtain led to a significant rise in East-West migration.  Besides, 
political and war refugees migrated from former Yugoslavia. 
 
 
II - Migration 
Explaining rural to urban labour migration and evaluating its consequences are important for 
understanding economic development.  Urbanization certainly seems to be a concomitant of 
economic growth.  The countries with higher per capita income also have larger proportions of 
their population residing in urban areas.  For the most part, this urbanization has been viewed as 
desirable.  For example, in dualistic theories of growth and development, migration is seen as a 
key to economic growth.  Development is seen as a process where labour is transferred from a 
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low productivity, rural sector to a high productivity, urban sector thereby increasing output as a 
whole.  This view is strikingly illustrated in the dualistic growth models. 
The views of migration which are most consistent with dualistic models either view the potential  
migrant as a supplier of labour or as an investor in human capital.  These two views and the 
research which they have generated will be outlined in this section.  A third approach which views 
the migrant as a consumer of regional amenities such as public goods will also be sketched.  
Finally, a new approach which views the potential migrant as a producer of home produced 
commodities will be outlined.  These four views will be classified the labour-flow view, the human 
capital view, the urban amenities view and the household production view respectively. 
The Labour-flow View 
In labour-flow models, migration is viewed as being labour‟s response to regional labour market 
disequilibrium.  To illustrate this adjustment process consider a simple production function with 
two inputs, labour and capital.  Furthermore, assume each input is paid its marginal product.  Let 
MPL and MPK be the marginal products of labour and capital in a region where labour is 
relatively abundant and let MPL‟and MPK‟ be the marginal products for labour scarce regions.  
Assuming normal inputs, where the marginal product of a factor is positively related to the 
quantity of the other factor employed, MPL<MPL‟ and MPK> MPK‟.  If only real returns are 
important, equilibrium exists when factors of production receive the same real return in each 
region (i.e., when MPL=MPL‟ and MPK=MPK‟).  This equilibrium will be achieved because 
factors, both capital and labour, will flow to the region where they have the greatest return.  As 
labour flows to the high wage region, MPL‟ will fall (and MPK‟ rise) due to the increased supply 
of workers in the wage region.  Similarly, MPL will rise (and MPK fall) with the reduction of 
workers in the low wage region.  Capital should, of course, flow in the opposite direction as 
labour reinforcing these changes in factor prices.  This adjustment will continue until real regional 
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wage differentials are entirely explained by regional wage and capital rigidities and the resulting 
unemployment or by moving costs. 
In dualistic development theories, the labour-flow model, in its simplest form, can be stated as 
(2) M = β(w - s), β > 0, 
where M represents net rural to urban migration, w is the real urban wage rate, s is the real rural 
wage rate, typically assumed to be at subsistence, and β is a scalar which represents imperfect 
information, moving costs and artificial barriers which restrict the speed of adjustment. If w falls 
as the size of the urban labour force rises (i.e., if labour and capital are substitutes and if the 
labour force grows more rapidly than the capital stock) then migration will fall through time as the 
urban-rural real wage differential narrows.  Indeed, the eventual narrowing of real wage 
differentials is a major prediction of the model.  The apparent failure of real wages to narrow has 
generated much empirical research and several innovations. It is important to properly define the 
real wage rates in the model.  In general, it is thought that the costs of living are higher in urban 
areas than in rural areas.  Hence, nominal wage rates are expected to be higher in cities.  In terms 
of equation (2), M = 0 when w = s.  Since w and s are real wage rates, the nominal wage rate in 
equilibrium (i.e. when w = s ) is higher in the urban area.  These wage rates should of course be 
made occupation or skill specific in order to obtain the relevant comparison. 
One influential view of why real regional wage rates may not converge was stated by 
Myrdal(1957).
 
Regional differences in skill or education may be self-perpetuating because higher 
skilled and better educated individuals are the most likely to migrate out of depressed regions.  If 
this education is largely paid for by those living in the depressed region, the exodus of the most 
skilled persons will further impoverish the region resulting in higher out migration in the future.  
Myrdal presented this drain of skilled persons as an example of a vicious cycle. 
Another explanation, for the failure of urban-rural real wage differentials to narrow, concentrates  
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on employment differentials which can occur when labour markets fail to function perfectly.  
Union or government restrictions on hiring, restrictive land tenure laws, discrimination, and high 
wage policies of governments, private employers or unions may be a cause of such failure.  In 
early dualistic models it was assumed that there is no unemployment in the urban sector and no 
observed unemployment in the rural sector.  Rural workers simply shared jobs and could be 
transferred to the urban sector without cost.  Later models introduce urban unemployment.  
Potential migrants must look not only at the wage rate they would earn if employed but must also 
look at the probability they will be employed.  In the Harris-Todaro model, the probability a 
potential migrant will be unemployed is assumed to be the proportion of urban workers who are 
currently unemployed. This assumption allows equation (2) to be rewritten as 
(3) M = β (δw - s ), 
where δ = 1 - u and u is the unemployment rate.  Hence, δ is the employment rate and δw is real 
expected urban wage income. 
This simple equation (3) has many implications for trade theory and public finance as well as for 
labour economics. For the moment, consider the implications of equation (3) for regional wage 
differentials.  If δw - s > 0, labour will flow into the urban area lowering δw.  Note that it is not 
necessary that wage rates be flexible in order for δw to fall.  The equilibrating mechanism might 
be a rise in unemployment.  δw will continue to fall untilδw = s.  Hence. Migration may not 
necessarily cause regional wage differentials to narrow. 
Another notable feature of the model is that job creation may increase both the number of 
unemployed workers and the rate of unemployment.  Suppose the labour market is initially in 
equilibrium in the sense that δw = s with w and s fixed.   The creation of urban jobs will initially 
increase δ resulting in more rural to urban migration in response to the increased probability of 
employment.  Equilibrium is restored when 1/δ rural workers move to the urban area for each job 
  11 
created.  The unemployment rate in the urban market returns to its former level with both more 
urban workers and more workers unemployed.  However, the unemployment rate in the economy 
as a whole rises because the high unemployment urban sector increases in relative importance in 
the economy. 
The Harris-Todaro model suggests two ways of lowering unemployment rates.  Urban jobs could 
be made less attractive or rural jobs could be made more attractive.  For example, a fall in the 
urban wage rate would make urban jobs less attractive.  A fall in w would reduce δw and workers 
would leave the urban area.  Consequently, δ would rise (unemployment would fall) offsetting the 
fall in w.  Similarly, a rise in traditional, rural income, s, would lead to an increase in δ as urban 
workers moved to the rural area.  If a decline in w is thought to be undesirable, policy could be 
directed at improving the traditional, rural economy as the best way of reducing urban 
unemployment. 
 The Harris-Todaro migration model, like the labour-flow model from which it is derived, views  
migration in a narrow context where net migration occurs as a response to opportunities to earn 
higher income.  The model is an aggregate model where aggregate migration responds to regional 
variables.  It does not directly address the question of why some persons move and others stay.  
The next model to be discussed, does address the question of who moves.  Migration is viewed as 
an investment decision.  Investment costs involves returns over time. These costs might properly 
be thought of as including a period of job search in the urban area.  Recent migrants may be much 
more likely to be unemployed than established residents.  Hence, unemployment, and the resulting 
temporary loss in income, might be better viewed as investment required to earn higher future 
income.  The migrant might, then, be properly viewed as an investor in human capital and not 
simply as a supplier of labour. 
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The Human Capital View 
In the human capital view of migration, migration is viewed as an investment decision like any 
other investment decision.  Costs are incurred in anticipation of future gains.  Central to the 
investment decision is the identification of the costs and returns from migration.  
Here it is argued that  persons or families look at the net present value of a move.  Net present 
value is given by 
 
where yt = δtw is urban income, r is the rate of time discount and C is the cost of moving.  Note 
that in equation (4) the costs of moving are assumed to occur before the move.  The wage rates 
are assumed to be constant.  However, expected income is different for each year because the 
probability of unemployment is assumed to depend upon time. Note that if δt is constant and if C 
= 0, then the model collapses to the labour-flow model in equation (3).  For any time τ>0, if δt =0 
for t <τ and δt=1 for tτ, then unemployment merely increases the cost of a move.  The expected 
duration of the initial job search (i.e., τ ) and not the average regional unemployment rate becomes 
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the crucial unemployment variable. Equation (4)  suggests that migration is discouraged by high 
costs of funding a move. Also, the use of PV begs question of access to borrowing/lending 
institutions (Ghatak and Levine,1994). 
The explicit treatment of migration as an investment decision provides a further explanation of 
why regional wage differentials may narrow.  The costs of a move must be covered by the 
discounted differences in income.  The human capital model moves away from the aggregate 
labour-flow model to an emphasis on individual decisions.  Persons or families with a positive net 
present value from migration move.  Those with a negative net present value stay.  
Empirical studies concentrate on determining the characteristics of individuals or families that 
make them prone to migrate.  These characteristics are introduced to the studies in terms of how 
they are thought to influence the costs or benefits of a move.  Age, education, marital status, 
occupation, sex, employment status, income, and the number of children are all characteristics 
which have been included in studies of migration because they are thought to systematically 
influence the costs or benefits of a move.  Regional characteristics such as average employment 
rates and average income and the distribution of that income have been included in human capital  
models as affecting the expected costs or benefits of a move. 
In terms of policy, one of the more important variables is education, which is thought to lead to 
more migration.  Migrants are risk takers, as are any other investors, and education may both 
reduce risk and enhance the ability of a person to bear risk.  Education will reduce risk to the 
extent that it represents general human capital enabling the person to adjust to a wider variety of 
occupations and life styles.  Education makes it easier to bear risk because it represents higher life 
time wealth enabling the person to bear a temporary loss in income.  Within the context of 
dualistic development views, rural education is encouraged partly because it is thought to increase 
rural to urban migration resulting in a better allocation of resources. 
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Nonmonetary, psychic, costs and benefits may also be included in the model.  Caution should be 
exercised, however, when dealing with these psychic costs.  For example, persons may be 
reluctant to leave friends, relatives, and the comfortable life style of their birth place.  This 
reluctance is a psychic cost.  Other persons may be eager to escape the restrictive life style of their 
birth place.  This eagerness is called a psychic benefit.  The persistence of regional wage 
differentials might be explained in terms of psychic costs, while the higher mobility of some 
subgroups of people may be explained in terms of psychic benefits.  However, unless relative 
magnitudes of the costs and benefits can be independently assigned, the explanation is not 
testable. 
 
The Regional Amenities View 
The regional amenities view concentrates on migration as a decision to purchase regional 
amenities which are not available at the original location.  These amenities include public goods 
such as education, roads, water supply and sewage.  They also include physical aspects of the 
region such as climate and private goods which are not available at other locations.  The consumer 
pays for the availability of these amenities through taxes, to pay for public goods, and land rent.  
As consumers move to a region to purchase amenities, land rent rises and will continue to rise 
until households are in equilibrium.  Hence, migration is seen as equilibrating both the labour 
market (as in the labour-flow view) and the land market, with the emphasis on the land market. 
Regional wage differentials are still viewed as a key determinant in explaining migration.  Wage 
differentials determine the quantity of market goods and services which a person can purchase.  
The greater the difference in real income, the greater the quantity of market goods which can be 
purchased and the greater the level of utility, ceteris paribus. 
Externalities in consumption, however, may create regional differences in the variety and kinds of 
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market goods which are available.  For example, the variety of movies shown in an area depends 
on market size.  In addition, locations differ in terms of the availability of nonmarket public goods 
and nonproduced regional amenities. 
Much of the recent literature on migration in developed countries has focused on the migrant as a 
consumer of nonmarket regional amenities.  One hypothesis that has received some attention 
is that as a society becomes more prosperous, regional amenities will replace pecuniary motives in 
the migration process. Regional amenities are assumed to be luxury goods which are not 
purchased at low income.  Expenditures on these goods rise as a proportion of income once 
income rises above some critical level. Since the EAU countries are by definition low income 
countries, this hypothesis implies that regional amenities will not play an important role in the 
migration of people in the EAU countries. 
One question of concern is how to account for regional amenities in the migration investment 
decision.  Should enhanced regional amenities enter in the migration investment decision and 
counted as a gain from migration? If urban life styles are attractive per se then equation (3) should 
be rewritten as M = β(δw - s + a), where a represents the psychic net return from urban amenities. 
 High urban unemployment would then partly be the result of the attractiveness of urban living. 
We can suggest a simple answer to the question of how to count urban amenities.  These 
amenities are already reflected in the differences in rent on land.  In other words, land in desirable 
locations costs more than in undesirable locations.  Since differences in land costs are perhaps the 
major cause of differences in the costs of living, potential migrants are faced with paying for these 
regional amenities in the form of higher living costs.  In aggregate, the value of regional amenities 
may be largely cancelled by increased living costs.  Hence, aggregate migration can only be 
explained by regional amenities if the availability of regional amenities has not yet been reflected in 
land costs.  Furthermore, differences in living costs might play little role in migration because they 
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are offset by the value of regional amenities.  Consequently, the analysis of investment in 
migration can concentrate on differences in expected income.
There is reason to believe that regional amenities do, however, play an important role in the EAU 
countries.  Urban areas offer a life style which is often not available in rural areas.  As a country 
develops and incomes rise, families can be expected to shift their consumption patterns. As 
income rises, families generally choose to have fewer children and to increase expenditures per 
child.  This was interpreted in terms of choosing a higher quality of children and lower quantity.  
Some of these expenditures on children involve health and educational amenities which are more 
readily available in urban areas.  Hence, as education and income rise, families will tend to migrate 
to areas which have lower costs of raising higher quality children. 
 
The Household Production Approach 
 In the regional amenities view, tastes play an important role in determining migration.  Tastes are 
thought to vary with the life cycle and with education.  Educated persons are thought to have a 
taste for areas with better schooling, cultural surroundings, and more diversity in life styles. 
The Household production view of migration can be most sharply contrasted with the other three 
views by considering a nuclear family where the wife devotes all of her time to household 
production.  Such a wife plays no basic role in the labour-flow, human capital, and regional 
amenities approaches other than that she adds to the costs of a move.  For a wife working for 
wages, the income lost from quitting at the old location represents a cost of the move.  Unless she 
works, her contribution to moving costs comes largely through influencing psychic costs.  For 
example, no economic role is attached to differences in the level of education of wives unless their 
education is translated into actual earned income or into differences in the tastes of their family.  
In contrast, in the household production approach, the eduction of the wife specializing in home 
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production can be given a concrete interpretation.  Education enhances the ability of the wife to 
produce commodities, The value of the wife‟s household production at the old location is a cost 
of a move.  The value of her home production at the new location is a benefit of a move or she 
may get a job in the new location. 
Employment and the level of market earnings of the wife are usually thought to be negatively 
associated with moves of the family to a new labour market. The reason for this negative 
relationship is that these earnings are assumed to be difficult to transfer.  In many instances 
household production may also be difficult to transfer.  For countries where wives  seldom work 
for wages, household production is important in the migration decision.  To a considerable extent, 
food is prepared, clothing is made and repaired, and both children and the elderly are cared for in 
the home.  In addition, a large proportion of the goods consumed by the family is produced in the 
family‟s own garden or earned in the informal sector where remunerations are seldom reported.  
These activities may be costly to transfer. 
Consider the choice between living in an urban area with readily available urban amenities or in a 
rural area that allows for close contact with relatives and friends.  In the urban area, the shadow 
prices of educational activities and of recreational activities might be low, while the shadow price 
of contacts with friends or relatives could be high.  If the family lives in the rural area, the family 
could produce commodities associated with urban amenities by occasionally making trips to the 
urban centre for educational, recreational, and health services.  However, the costs of these trips 
to the city would increase the costs of producing urban amenity commodities while living in the 
rural location.  Living in an urban area might greatly reduce the costs of urban related 
commodities. Hence, location will affect both the shadow prices of home-produced commodities 
and the full income of the family. 
In figure 2, we explain the efficiency gains in a perfect world without barriers to labour mobility.  
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Hamilton and Whalley (1986), using a general equilibrium model, have shown that such mobility  
could be substantial (about 6%) of the world GDP).  In fig 2(a), we show the pre-migration 
labour market in the Eastern and Western Europe.  Due to the access to superior technology, 
better organisation and human capital, MPL in the West is higher than in the East as shown by the 
positions of the MPLW and MPLE.  Real wages are higher in the west (Ww) in comparison with 
east (We) as shown on the vertical axis of fig 2(A) with employment at δA (measured on the 
horizontal axis).  In fig. 2(B), we show that after migration of labour from the East to the West, 
equilibrium real wage is now W.  The welfare gains are equal to  KED (West) + 
EDCJ(migrants); loss for East   FGJ = EJC.  Thus the net overall gain = EKDC.  Incidentally, 
Hamilton and Whalley (1986) estimate this area for global perfect labour mobility.  Clearly, the 
size of the gain will depend on the degree of labour mobility, nature and quality of labour, 
substitutability or complementarity between domestic and foreign labour and the degree of labour 
absorption in the labour market given by the real wage flexibility.  Inter alia, the greater the wage 
flexibilty in the host country, the greater would be the welfare gain (Ghatak et al. 1996; Levine, 
1999). 
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Figure 2 : Migration and Welfare [ Adapted from Levine, Paul, 1999] 
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Figure 2 – Employment and Real Wage After Migration 
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Since the fall of the „iron-curtain‟ in the late 1980s, an increasing number of immigrants has been 
arriving with neither the support nor the consent of the Western European countries.  Such 
migration is now part of a new „normality‟.  It consists of ethnic minorities, political and economic 
refugees and new labour migrants.  The socio-economic features of the new E-W migrants, the 
estimation of the potential migrant flows, the careful analysis of the socio-economic impact of 
such migration and a comparison of the political reactions in W. Europe should be the main items 
of a future research agenda within an inter-disciplinary framework.  A simple but strict political 
insulation policy through tough border controls is no substitute for a sober welfare enhancing 
migration policy.  To implement such a policy, we need to undertake both the macro and micro-
analysis of migration.  We‟ve already discussed the macro issues of migration and welfare.  At the 
micro level, we need to concentrate on the following issues: 
A. Characteristics of migrants: 
I) age, sex, household size and marital status 
ii) education, experience and skill 
iii) nationality and political status (i.e. legal , illegal) 
iv) self-selection in observable features  
B. Determinants of flows: 
I) Desire, e.g. unemployment rates in the East; wage gap; differences in cost of living; 
 location specific public goods amenities, schools, hospitals etc.; previous migration and 
 cyclical factors. 
II) Ability: Ability to migrate would depend on the following factors: 
I) distance; ii) liquidity constraints and access to credit and finance (Ghatak and  
 Levine 1994). Immigration policies within the host countries; and absorptive  
 capacity of the recipient countries. 
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C. Migration Decision: 
As regards decision to migrate, the following three factors deserve special attention: 
a) individual vs. Household ;b) role of women; c) asymmetry of information 
d) the option value of waiting: needless to say that factors (b), (c) and (d) are very 
 under-researched areas. 
D. Welfare effects: 
a) Destination country - on labour markets; 
- on immigrant workers and government budget constraints; 
- the process of assimilation. 
b) In Origin country on  a) wages and employment; 
b) composition of labour and „back wash‟ effects 
c) remittances and their effects on employment 
Gender and Migration 
 
Possibly because of its concentration on labour-market issues, and within this no consideration of 
gendered roles for the suppliers of labour, much of the economic analysis of migration has not felt 
the need to explore gendered questions. 
In consequence this literature has possibly dealt arbitrarily with questions such as whether 
individuals or families migrate, whether migrating individuals retain family membership, whether 
migrating families retain citizenship of the home country, whether we should expect to observe 
seasonal or temporary migration and  whether the migration decision is likely to impact on intra-
family relationships. 
 
It could be argued that such gender-neutral analysis has implicitly accepted Becker‟s (1981) 
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“unitary” model of the family, in which all economic decisions are made by an altruistic household 
head, presumed male. In such a world the household head will presumably identify the most 
advantageous labour market and make this a basis for the family‟s migration decision. However, 
even in such a world the altruistic family head might need to compare the pros and cons of 
relocating the entire family or merely one or more of its labour market participants. 
 
As Agarwal (1997) points out, many authors have found Becker‟s approach (to understanding a 
household‟s economic decisions) to be relatively futile. Again, the possibility exists that  the 
concentration on labour market issues implicit in this approach (see Becker 1965) is partly to 
blame.  A broader perspective on individuals‟ endowments, as in Sen (1981), might include for 
example non-earned income, land entitlements and find these to offer a richer basis for 
understanding the aspects of a migration decision. 
 
The current theoretical support for analysis of within-family decision formation is essentially 
game-theoretic (see Agarwal (1997) for a survey). Family members continually re-contract, 
choosing between co-operation and conflict; individuals possess fall-back positions such as 
reconstructing their role within the family and in the limit leaving it; such fall-back positions 
constitute “threats” within a game-theoretic approach to bargaining but the threats are not all 
credible in all instances - “I‟ll divorce you if ... “ is not credible when bargaining over small 
matters. In such an analysis the relative bargaining strength of family members is crucial to the 
outcome and Agarwal gives a list of relevant factors which is paraphrased here as 
 
 ownership of and control over assets, e.g. arable land 
 access to income-earning opportunities 
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 access to communal resources 
 access to informal social support systems 
 access to support from formal structures - State and NGOs 
 social norms 
 
One salient feature of this list is that all factors may be sharply redefined by migration and that 
therefore migration is a nexus for the reconstruction of gendered roles within a household. Thus, 
for example, even if male and female parents are both individually advantaged by migration with 
respect to every factor listed migration could dramatically alter relative bargaining strengths and 
so it is not immediately obvious that we should expect to observe migration as a family. Versions 
of migration in which initially only one parent migrates or in which one parent permanently 
becomes a migrant worker, and which parent that might be, become easier to understand. 
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The value of an option to migrate 
 
Admitting uncertainty over future income streams not only modifies the standard conclusions 
about migration flows but also suggests a need to reconsider whether the standard welfare 
analysis (summarised in Figure 1) is an adequate basis for evaluating the benefits of free 
movement of labour. 
 
To put the argument briefly, an open borders policy can be viewed as giving agents an option to 
migrate should this ever seem their best decision. Thus the valuation methods developed within 
the finance literature for valuing those instruments that give their bearer an option to trade 
commodities or securities may also be appropriate for evaluating the welfare gains that follow 
from giving agents the option to migrate ( see e.g. Burda,1993). 
 
The most immediate implication of such an argument is that the option to migrate is valuable to a 
local agent not only when the local expected real wage is below that of the destination country but 
also when wages in one or both countries are so highly variable that, even though their relative 
levels do not currently trigger migration, there is some chance that they might do so in the future. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, we should emphasise that the overall economic welfare of migration will depend on 
the following critical factors: 
I) the degree of labour-market flexibility/wage rigidity in the host    
 country. 
ii) the nature of social and political absorption of the immigrants; 
iii) role of taxes/subsidies/controls 
iv) nature and impact of trade and aid flows 
v) pattern of convergence of economies. 
vi) the in-depth analysis of the implications of migration within the new theory of endogenous 
growth. (Barro, R et.al. 1995;Aghion & Hewitt, 1998)  
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As regards future research on migration under uncertainty, it should be noted that migration as  
financial options can be purchased by payment of a premium to an options trader. The options 
trader acts like an insurer, bearing the risk that the option will be exercised. Options are risk 
shifting devices. The following questions clearly arise: what risks are being shifted by an “option 
to migrate”? Who is bearing those risks? 
 
Options markets equilibrate when the premium is set at a market clearing level. What is the 
premium in the case of migration policy ? Maybe it‟s allowing migration in the reverse direction? 
This might make free migration a risk-pooling activity for the two countries. 
 
The option-pricing mechanics are relatively straightforward for a binomial option, i.e. an option 
on a security whose future value is either “high” or “low”. The analysis of uncertainty in Ghatak et 
al.(1996) is essentially binomial (job vs. no job) and so might be an appropriate starting point for 
rehearsing the mathematics involved. 
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